Die Tsunami- und Nuklear-Katastrophe 2011 in Japan : Der Umgang mit dem (Rest-)Risiko

The Tsunami and Nuclear Disaster 2011 in Japan: The Handling of the (Residual) Risk

Are so called natural disasters really »natural«? Or are they just as equally (or even specifically) »man-made«? If so, then their outcomes can be seen as risks. This article focuses on how (residual) risks were handled in the case of the 2011 »Great Eastern Japan Earthquake« (Higashi Nihon Daishinsai) with reference to risk theory and empirical research, including recent discourses about »Fukushima« and »(the) Japan(ese)«. How are (residual) risks to be evaluated? How are they perceived? Under which conditions are they taken and legitimized? Which lessons are learned from experiences with risks? Initially, I present discourses and options related to the term »risk«. This forms the basis for the main part of the article, which focuses on an analysis of the 2011 tsunami and nuclear disaster. Finally, I conclude with a discussion of how (residual) risks were handled, the systemic nature of vulnerability in the case of Japan, and the lessons which can be learned.